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Why corporate diversity programs fail, and what to do about it

Diversity and equality of opportunity are good things. And discrimination, on the other hand, is both morally repugnant and economically foolhardy. And yet it persists.

So how on earth could programs designed to encourage diversity and opportunity and to discourage discrimination be a bad thing? That’s exactly the question asked and answered by Harvard prof Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev of Tel Aviv University, in research summarized in their Harvard Business Review piece, Why Diversity Programs Fail.

The goal of diversity programs is a laudable one, namely to increase diversity as a way of fighting back against systemic discrimination. The corporate world is in many ways still a male world, and a white male world at that. In spite of advances, women and minority groups still make up disproportionately small proportion of managers at big companies. If change is coming, it is coming painfully slowly. As Dobbin and Kalev point out, “Black men have barely gained ground in corporate management since 1985. White women haven’t progressed since 2000.” And it’s not for lack of qualified management candidates. “[B]oth groups,” the authors point out, “have made huge educational gains over the past two generations.”

So it’s easy to see why some might think that good intentions aren’t enough, and that proactive diversity programs would be a useful thing. Except they aren’t. For evidence, Dobbin and Kalev looked at a range of programs designed to encourage diversity—including diversity training, formal grievance procedures, as well as hiring tests and performance rating systems—and their conclusion about them is resoundingly negative. The authors reach this conclusion based on literally thousands of academic studies that have found, time after time, that diversity programs not only don’t work, they tend to be counterproductive. At companies that have instituted them, diversity has typically actually been reduced.

Why don’t such programs work? Dobbin and Kalev suggest three problems. One is that such programs tend to be negative, focusing for example on legal implications. If we’re caught discriminating, we could be sued! People tend to react badly such reasoning. Second, some companies make diversity training courses compulsory, and employees tend to result compulsory training, and then (so the hypothesis goes) blame the very disadvantaged groups the programs were aiming to help. Finally, Dobbin and Kalev hypothesize that when managers see such programs instituted, they feel blamed, and react badly to that. The result in all three cases is the potential for backlash and for managers to find end-runs around programs they don’t like.

So why do big companies persist in using such programs? Dobbin and Kalev point to fear of legal liability. That is, managers need to look like they’re doing something, even if there’s no evidence that that “something” really works. It’s very much like a physician ordering extra, unnecessary diagnostic tests. The only thing that seems worse than doing it would be not doing it and then having trouble surface later.

The fact that such programs don’t work is further evidence for the truism that management, pretty generally, is a difficult task. Coordinating and motivating people to work together to achieve a goal—whether the goal is increased sales or increased diversity—is not easy. More specifically, it’s an example of the principle that the best way to institute change isn’t always the most straightforward-seeming way, which is to exert direct control by telling people what to do. As lawyer and legal scholar Scott Killingsworth argues, “command-and-control” approaches to compliance come with a number of inherent limitations and adverse side effects. When command-and-control doesn’t work, the better route is through the long, slow road of cultural change.

With regard to diversity, what does work? Dobbin and Kalev recommend three broad strategies, none of which focuses on control. First, they suggest that companies “engage managers in solving the problem.” For example, get them to act as mentors to people in disadvantaged groups, and get them personally involved in for example recruiting a wider range of diverse job candidates. The second strategy is to make use of what psychologists call the “mere exposure effect,” a psychological mechanism according to which merely being exposed to a person, idea, or group tends to result in positive feelings about them. So, expose employees to people from different groups (for example by having them work together on diverse, self-managing teams). Finally, Dobbin and Kalev suggest making managers feel personally accountable for change. Not accountable in a legalistic way; accountable in a social way that comes with the feeling that people around you area aware of your behaviour. To this end, the authors recommend department-level transparency about stats regarding who gets hired and who gets promoted, and the institution of diversity task-forces with members drawn from various departments.

Perhaps most fundamentally, Dobbin and Kalev recommend that it be made clear, within the organizations, that top managers are paying attention to the issue of diversity. That is, what matters is not that the boss is telling you what to do; what matters is that the boss cares, and cares enough to pay personal attention.


    
 


CSR-JOBS.NET: MACN Collective Action Lead

The MACN Collective Action Lead operates as an integral part of the global MACN program team. The Collective Action Lead will be primarily responsible for developing, managing, and scaling MACN’s collective action projects in an effective and cost-efficient way to promote trade and transparency and to drive private sector leadership on combating corruption and bribery in the port and maritime sector in developing countries. … [visit site to read more]

    
 


Zika Virus: Should the Rio Olympics Sponsors Back Out?

What should Olympic sponsors and ‘partners’ like Coke and General Electric and Visa do in light of expert recommendations that the Summer Olympics in Rio be postponed or moved?

Nearly 200 prominent scientists, physicians, and ethicists from around the globe have signed a letter arguing that the 2016 Summer Olympics scheduled to be held in Rio de Janero this August be postponed or moved due to the risks posed by the mosquito-borne Zika virus. The letter is technically addressed to the head of the World Health Organization, urging WHO to conduct a “a fresh, evidence-based assessment” of the risks that Zika poses, and asking WHO to use its powers of persuasion (and its close connection to the International Olympic Committee) to get the IOC to rethink things. In particular, the letter notes the risk implied by having 500,000 athletes and tourists visit Rio and then return home, potentially spreading Zika to every corner of the globe. To date, the WHO for its part seems unmoved.

But the letter omits any mention of the other powerful decision-makers in this situation, namely the corporations that will have their logos splashed all over every moment of the Summer Olympics, regardless of where and when it happens. The 2016 Olympics’ “Worldwide Olympic Partners” include Coca-Cola, Bridgestone, McDonald’s, General Electric, Visa, and others. Dozens of other companies are listed as “Official Sponsors,” “Official Supporters,” or “Suppliers.” Becoming a top-tier Worldwide Olympic Partners costs something on the order of $100 million. That kind of cash surely brings considerable influence. The question: should they use that influence with regard to the Zika issue, and what should their position be?

Ethically, these companies should be wary of contributing to an event that could globalize an ongoing epidemic. The trouble is that expert opinions on the degree of danger here differ. The letter-writers represent a very broad range of experts, but not all of the experts that there are. The head of the US Centres for Disease Control, Dr Tom Frieden, for example says “There is no public health reason to cancel or delay the Olympics.” But there’s reason to be risk averse, here. The worst-case scenario if the Olympics proceed as planned is very bad, and includes unnecessary birth defects as well as potential neurological damage in adults. And the worst-case scenario isn’t science fiction: it’s a plausible hypothesis set forward by a substantial group of respected experts.

In reasoning about this, Olympic partners and sponsors face two dangers that could warp their ethical reasoning.

The first danger is the fact that, in terms of potential outcomes for sponsors, the situation is seriously asymmetrical. If the games get moved or postponed, this presumably throws a monkey-wrench into each sponsor’s scheduled advertising. On the other hand, if the games go ahead and if there’s then an up-tick in cases of Zika around the world, sponsors have a two-pronged defence: first, “you can’t prove it’s because of the Olympics” (which is probably true) and second, “the CDC and WHO said it was OK” (which they did). So it will be easy for Olympic partners and sponsors say — and maybe actually believe — that there’s no downside to going ahead.

The second danger is a risk that the sponsors will fall prey to the IOC’s general “can-do,” and “the Olympics must go on!” attitude. It’s widely recognized that a “can-do” attitude is what led NASA to launching the Space Shuttle Challenger, despite warnings that doing so could be unsafe. The results of that can-do attitude are notorious.

In my view, Olympic partners and sponsors should resist the dangers noted above. In the end, this may well be a case where the corporations need to trust the experts, or the bulk of them, and at very least lend their weight to the argument in favour of giving the Summer Olympics a very serious second look.


    
 


What Baseball’s Rules — Written and Unwritten — Tell us About Business Ethics

The fist that landed on Jose Bautista’s jaw echoed around the baseball world almost as loudly as his famous “bat flip” last October. And whereas Bautista’s bat flip violated the unwritten rule against grandstanding, Texas Rangers second baseman Rougned Odor’s punch violated the written rules, but also followed from a different, unwritten rule that permits retribution. In particular, Odor was getting back at Bautista for a very aggressive slide into second base just seconds before — which may in turn have been retribution for a fastball to the ribs that Bautista had previously suffered at the hands of a Rangers pitcher, and which was presumed to be intended as — you guessed it — retribution for last fall’s bat flip. That’s how retribution often works, namely that it results in a string of tit-for-tat acts of violence with no natural end point.

But what’s important, here, from a business point of view, is to see the way all of this plays out within what has been structured, intentionally, as an adversarial system. This kind of eye-for-an-eye pattern of retribution would be seriously problematic in private life; but on a baseball field, it’s merely the working out of a set of informal rules designed to civilize a rather aggressive set of activities.

The point here is that in baseball — as in business — people on opposing “teams” aren’t supposed to get along. They’re supposed to compete, each trying to get the better of the other. And such competitive domains typically have their own rules, rules that permit behaviours not considered OK in everyday life. In everyday life, after all, throwing a ball towards someone at 96mph would be considered recklessly dangerous, possibly criminal. But that’s something major league pitchers are encouraged to do, if they can. And in everyday life, causing a person to lose their job would be a terrible thing to do. But in business if you invent a better mousetrap and force makers of lesser mousetraps out of business, that’s considered entirely justified in the name of innovation.

As philosopher Joseph Heath has convincingly argued, this idea of constrained competition serves as a strong foundation for an ethics of business grounded in the goals of markets themselves. Business is tough and competitive, but even tough, competitive games need rules if they are to achieve their purpose. In a business context this puts limits on the aggressive strategies that managers can use in pursuit of profit. Managers of competing companies are free to act aggressively, trying to outmanoeuvre each other, zealously seeking out efficiencies, devising devilishly clever new products and so on, all in an effort to drive the “other guy’s” market share to zero. Managers at all competing firms employ the same tactics, and generally it is the consumer who wins by gaining access to better and better products at lower and lower prices. But the permission to act aggressively in the market — permission granted as an exemption from the rules of polite society — is limited by requirements that the competitors avoid taking things too far, by for example sabotaging each other’s factories or lying to customers to boost sales. Those would certainly be competitive strategies, but anti-social ones.

My Ryerson colleague Hasko von Kriegstein argues, in a forthcoming paper, that this obligation to compete in a constrained way in principle really applies to corporate shareholders, not to managers. After all, shareholders are the ones seeking to profit in the market, so it’s their profit-seeking behaviour that must be constrained. But it still implies limits on the behaviour of managers because managers act as shareholders’ agents in the marketplace. When you’re the one “on the field,” you’re the one subject to the rules.

And in both business and in baseball, the rules — both written and unwritten — serve to protect a range of stakeholders. Some rules protect participants. Others protect innocent bystanders. In some cases, the written rules are controversial or unclear. And in others, the unwritten rules are uncertain. And so sometimes the former get changed or clarified, and the latter evolve. But we can’t begin to understand the point and the proper scope of particular rules — rules against aggressive slides, rules against insider trading, etc. — and the way those rules differ from the rules of everyday life, without understanding that they are rules whose logic is internal to the game, a way to civilize a justifiably aggressive activity.


    
 


What Baseball’s Rules — Written and Unwritten — Tell us About Business Ethics

The fist that landed on Jose Bautista’s jaw echoed around the baseball world almost as loudly as his famous “bat flip” last October. And whereas Bautista’s bat flip violated the unwritten rule against grandstanding, Texas Rangers second baseman Rougned Odor’s punch violated the written rules, but also followed from a different, unwritten rule that permits retribution. In particular, Odor was getting back at Bautista for a very aggressive slide into second base just seconds before — which may in turn have been retribution for a fastball to the ribs that Bautista had previously suffered at the hands of a Rangers pitcher, and which was presumed to be intended as — you guessed it — retribution for last fall’s bat flip. That’s how retribution often works, namely that it results in a string of tit-for-tat acts of violence with no natural end point.

But what’s important, here, from a business point of view, is to see the way all of this plays out within what has been structured, intentionally, as an adversarial system. This kind of eye-for-an-eye pattern of retribution would be seriously problematic in private life; but on a baseball field, it’s merely the working out of a set of informal rules designed to civilize a rather aggressive set of activities.

The point here is that in baseball — as in business — people on opposing “teams” aren’t supposed to get along. They’re supposed to compete, each trying to get the better of the other. And such competitive domains typically have their own rules, rules that permit behaviours not considered OK in everyday life. In everyday life, after all, throwing a ball towards someone at 96mph would be considered recklessly dangerous, possibly criminal. But that’s something major league pitchers are encouraged to do, if they can. And in everyday life, causing a person to lose their job would be a terrible thing to do. But in business if you invent a better mousetrap and force makers of lesser mousetraps out of business, that’s considered entirely justified in the name of innovation.

As philosopher Joseph Heath has convincingly argued, this idea of constrained competition serves as a strong foundation for an ethics of business grounded in the goals of markets themselves. Business is tough and competitive, but even tough, competitive games need rules if they are to achieve their purpose. In a business context this puts limits on the aggressive strategies that managers can use in pursuit of profit. Managers of competing companies are free to act aggressively, trying to outmanoeuvre each other, zealously seeking out efficiencies, devising devilishly clever new products and so on, all in an effort to drive the “other guy’s” market share to zero. Managers at all competing firms employ the same tactics, and generally it is the consumer who wins by gaining access to better and better products at lower and lower prices. But the permission to act aggressively in the market — permission granted as an exemption from the rules of polite society — is limited by requirements that the competitors avoid taking things too far, by for example sabotaging each other’s factories or lying to customers to boost sales. Those would certainly be competitive strategies, but anti-social ones.

My Ryerson colleague Hasko von Kriegstein argues, in a forthcoming paper, that this obligation to compete in a constrained way in principle really applies to corporate shareholders, not to managers. After all, shareholders are the ones seeking to profit in the market, so it’s their profit-seeking behaviour that must be constrained. But it still implies limits on the behaviour of managers because managers act as shareholders’ agents in the marketplace. When you’re the one “on the field,” you’re the one subject to the rules.

And in both business and in baseball, the rules — both written and unwritten — serve to protect a range of stakeholders. Some rules protect participants. Others protect innocent bystanders. In some cases, the written rules are controversial or unclear. And in others, the unwritten rules are uncertain. And so sometimes the former get changed or clarified, and the latter evolve. But we can’t begin to understand the point and the proper scope of particular rules — rules against aggressive slides, rules against insider trading, etc. — and the way those rules differ from the rules of everyday life, without understanding that they are rules whose logic is internal to the game, a way to civilize a justifiably aggressive activity.


    
 


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