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Copyright: Creative is as creative does![]()
Arctic Pear by Ochre Most of my writing here about copyright law concerns the misuse and abuse of its heavily pro-plaintiff provisions such that there is little or no incentive against the filing of meritless claims of infringement. In particular I have focused on scams such as Righthaven, the now-defunct copyright trolling operation, and the use or threatened use of attorneys’ fees and statutory damages as part of such claims. Often these components are wildly out of proportion to the loss suffered, though anyone familiar with the pre-digital copyright regime understands that this is meant as a feature, not a bug. If it were otherwise, casual infringement of typically non-wealthy creators would be a completely rational, if unethical, business practice, and the cost of the odd successful attempt at compliance would easily be absorbed as a cost of doing business. And that odd attempt would be odd indeed, because without providing an incentive to attorneys to represent creators in such situations, they would have very little leverage over infringers. My concern has always been when we move from “leverage” to arbitrage, which was what we had with Righthaven. On the other hand, as a former journalist and author, and a person who often represents creators, I have, as regular readers know, never been sympathetic to the “information wants to be free” non-sequitur. Creative works are not merely “information”; even “information” can be proprietary under many circumstances; and neither information nor art, in any case, has any desire for freedom or for anything else, even chocolate. So, what is the geometry here? There are creators of works subject to protection by copyright — authors, producers of visual works, songwriters, musicians and others. There are distributors of content, who usually pay creators a pittance for their work but have the capital, technology and market access to exploit its value well. There are consumers of content, who may or may not pay the legitimate price for their consumption. And then there are the others: The purported fair users, the search engines, the homage-payers, the derivative-workers. They are not quite consumers, but unquestionably many of them profit from creative works. Does copyright contemplate that they should be able to do so, or not? With some of these preliminary thoughts in mind, consider, now, this blog post from David Newhoff:
He links to this piece by David Lowery:
I wonder.
I was following until about … there. Family photo album scenarios, it seems to me, are the last refuge of scoundrels in copyright debates. But there is no question that digitization has made a mess of things, and that creators have less control over their works than ever before — something we all noticed a long time ago. Lowery is on firmer equitable ground when he complains as follows about the practical ineffectiveness of the DMCA for photographers and songwriters:
What to do? One approach might be to start at Square One and take a serious look at what the Copyright Act at least purports to protect, and what it doesn’t, so that we don’t get bogged down in arguments about baby . Next month I have oral argument in Ochre LLC v. Deutschebank, an appeal from a case where the Southern District of New York deemed a line of fairly famous, recognizable, original and creative lighting fixtures by my client, Ochre LLC — called the “Arctic Pair” — unprotectible on the ground that they are just lighting fixtures. For all practical purposes, I argue on the appeal, the present position of the courts is that any artistic (sculptural) work that may have the property of providing illumination cannot, by virtue of shedding light, be a creative work — and that this was never the intent of Congress. We seek to overturn both the dismissal of the copyright claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the original determination of the Copyright Office that the work could not be registered. On the other hand, I also represent the creators of photographic works. In another case that I am not going to specify here, my client is somewhat bogged down in problems arising from the status of his registration, or inability to register, some of his photographs (which he undertook to do prior to engaging me). The registration of works, as Lowery notes, is the be-all and end-all of copyright remedies. He also states, however, the following:
This is an odd juxtaposition to me. The way many courts interpret current law, if Da Vinci stuck a night light in the Mona Lisa’s mouth, he could not own the copyright in his painting of her if it were created and published in 2013. On the other hand, photographers have an annoying problem: It’s a real pain for them to go through the trouble of registering the hundreds of “creative works” they create in a single photo session. I’m a photographer too, okay? I put my pictures on Flickr and sometimes people want to use them, and in return for attribution, I let them. The fact is, some people think some of the shots are pretty good — in many instances they are, I also believe subjectively, truly creative and original. So I am entitled to control their use, even though I publish them for free. Sometimes people use them without permission, and this makes me sad, but I do not try to make a living from my photos. I merely seek to brighten your dark lives with my creative brilliance. Other people, however, do want to make a living taking pictures. Power to them. But especially in light (*cough*) of the situation faced by my client, Ochre, which can’t even register truly original creative works that cost a fortune to create, it’s a little hard to feel sorry for people who have to go through the trouble of registering all those photographs, those hundreds of creative finger-twitches, in order to be able to protect them fully. In fact, as David Newhoff argues, somewhat seeming to miss the implications of his own words:
I don’t know how the fact that we’re all “authors” does or does not cut across the geometric lines that connect and dissect the various interests aligned and opposed with respect to copyright. I do think, however, that my example of what seems like an inexplicable inequity, i.e., the Arctic Pearl-vs.-snapshot copyright dichotomy, suggests that we’re not even starting with a realistic reckoning of what constitutes creativity, much what it make take properly to protect it. Rather, we’re fighting — just as we see in trademark — over extant rent-collecting regimes that reflect all sorts of historical and technological developments that have nothing to do with fairness at all. That’s a mistake. We should have creators at the creation of any new copyright regime, and we should listen to what they have to say. But we should also prepare them to defend why their creativity is as entitled to the range of protection they demand for it. I don’t know how to measure units of creativity (are they like the “utiles” we learned about in economics?). Newhoff, rejecting what he clealy views as a copyright-nihilism point of view that argues for simplicity but essentially stands for a very weak copyright regime indeed, writes, “More to the point, though, if technology has made the world of consuming content more complex, is it disingenuous to suggest that revising copyright to balance the rights of authors and consumers in the digital age would not produce an even more complex set of statutes?” I think it would. But copyright enthusiasts across the arts implicated should be careful what they wish for on that score. The debate could prove very enlightening.
Free speech for hosersOriginally posted 2007-04-04 23:38:57. Republished by Blog Post Promoter The headline: “Canada to trademark [sic] ‘winter’ for 2010 Olympics.” The not so bright line![]()
Parallel lines never intersect, do they?
John Welch links to this fantastic article in the Trademark Reporter by Anthony L. Fletcher, discussing the critical — and, like so much in trademark law, vaguely described — legal distinction between generic and descriptive trademarks (or rather, in the case of genericness, would-be trademarks):
And here I break off for two reasons (copyright infringement not being one; I’m nowhere near the fair use threshold). One is that you, dear reader, need a break. And the other one is that what follows is worth its own separate block quote:
Sweet.
Related, but too tangential for now. Let’s revisit that one later. I actually thought Fletcher’s criticism of this formulation would be, though, it was a tautology: How do we know if something is generic? Why, the name refers to the genus of the thing! But I think that point would border on the tautological as well — in fact, the phrase “tautological standard in trademark law” is probably not only a tautology itself, but is probably, um, “generic,” along with “unpredictable standard in trademark law.” Or have you heard about this LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION thing? Anyway, the article is great, and you have to read it (and I have to read it more, and better.) Fletcher’s conclusion:
He goes on to suggest a handful of approaches to the problem. They do not, at first blush, simplify matters. But perhaps, if adopted, they could clarify them — an end sorely to be desired in trademark law. If it’s going to be this busy, this expensive, this profitable, can’t it be a little more predictable? Or have I missed the point — again?
Don’t play games!Originally posted 2008-01-24 15:30:04. Republished by Blog Post Promoter Nolo’s Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Blog links to this story here in answering the question, “How do I create a non-infringing board game”?” Semaphores and metalesOriginally posted 2007-01-23 17:16:51. Republished by Blog Post Promoter Two kinds of analogy, as scrambled by an old and dear friend. Evidently, there is another kind. John Welch writes about a TTAB decision cancelling trademark registrations based on the petitioners use of the mark, for purposes of avoiding a defense of abandonment against the putative senior user, that is not quite trademark use but is “analogous to trademark use.” John writes about the rather thin reed on which the TTAB places the weight of this cancellation for the mark “ALS IK KAN” — Finnish for “All I Can” — by noting that the Board seemed to have done all it could to return the ownership of the mark to a lineal descendant of the senior user. I would have liked to hear more from John about this entire concept of “analogous to trademark use” use. Maybe I will.
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