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"LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION®" - 5 new articles

  1. Copyright: Creative is as creative does
  2. Free speech for hosers
  3. The not so bright line
  4. Don’t play games!
  5. Semaphores and metales
  6. More Recent Articles
  7. Search LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION®
  8. Prior Mailing Archive

Copyright: Creative is as creative does

2 arctic pear chandelier round 45cm web1303836406 296x300 Copyright:  Creative is as creative does

 

Arctic Pear by Ochre

Most of my writing here about copyright law concerns the misuse and abuse of its heavily pro-plaintiff provisions such that there is little or no incentive against the filing of meritless claims of infringement.  In particular I have focused on scams such as Righthaven, the now-defunct copyright trolling operation, and the use or threatened use of attorneys’ fees and statutory damages as part of such claims.  Often these components are wildly out of proportion to the loss suffered, though anyone familiar with the pre-digital copyright regime understands that this is meant as a feature, not a bug.  If it were otherwise, casual infringement of typically non-wealthy creators would be a completely rational, if unethical, business practice, and the cost of the odd successful attempt at compliance would easily be absorbed as a cost of doing business.  And that odd attempt would be odd indeed, because without providing an incentive to attorneys to represent creators in such situations, they would have very little leverage over infringers.

My concern has always been when we move from “leverage” to arbitrage, which was what we had with Righthaven.  On the other hand, as a former journalist and author, and a person who often represents creators, I have, as regular readers know, never been sympathetic to the “information wants to be free” non-sequitur.  Creative works are not merely “information”; even “information” can be proprietary under many circumstances; and neither information nor art, in any case, has any desire for freedom or for anything else, even chocolate.

So, what is the geometry here?  There are creators of works subject to protection by copyright — authors, producers of visual works, songwriters, musicians and others.  There are distributors of content, who usually pay creators a pittance for their work but have the capital, technology and market access to exploit its value well.  There are consumers of content, who may or may not pay the legitimate price for their consumption.

And then there are the others:  The purported fair users, the search engines, the homage-payers, the derivative-workers.  They are not quite consumers, but unquestionably many of them profit from creative works.  Does copyright contemplate that they should be able to do so, or not?

With some of these preliminary thoughts in mind, consider, now, this blog post from David Newhoff:

Yesterday, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing meant to lay some of the groundwork for overhauling copyright law in the United States.  The title of the hearing is “A Case Study in Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project,” suggesting that the “project” is about establishing premises and ground rules for how the debate might be framed going forward.  I suppose because the word consensus is also part of the title, several lawmakers and the witnesses called to testify repeated the rhetorical question as to why debate about copyright has become so contentious.  For authors and creators who actually use copyrights to forge professional careers and build businesses, this feint at decorum will elicit a justifiable sneer because it’s kinda like saying, “All someone did was spit in your eye, and I don’t know why we can’t now have a civil discussion about the principles of expectoration.”  Of course, there weren’t any authors or creators present at this hearing, and that in itself has been cause for concern.

For the lawmakers who asked the question in earnest as to why the debate on this issue can be so vituperative, they need only have paid close attention to one subtle but significant choice of words in the testimony of Professor Pamela Samuelson when she was asked about the matter of online piracy.  Samuelson, the lead author of The Copyright Principles Project, stated that individual artists are at “some disadvantage” in protecting their rights on the internet.  Some disadvantage?  Like a lone Boy Scout would be at some disadvantage fending off a mechanized armored division.  The thing about consensus is that you can’t ask for it if you’re going to propose a foundation of “principles” predicated on lies and half truths.  The correct answer to the question asked of Professor Samuels is “Individual artists don’t stand a chance of protecting their rights on the internet; they might as well shout their grievances into the next passing hurricane for all the remedies and resources at their disposal.”

He links to this piece by David Lowery:

Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) plans a hearing on Thursday before the House Intellectual Property subcommittee to pursue his worthy goal of copyright reform.

The hearing is called “A Case Study for Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project” and focuses on a group called the “Copyright Principles Project” that produced a white paper called “The Copyright Principles Project: Directions For Reform.”

There are no creators involved in the Copyright Principles Project at all!  None.  As in not one.

The Internet has democratized creativity, but this group of Big Tech and Big Media companies and the lawyers and academics who love them is about as undemocratic a “consensus” as any artist could imagine.

Creators are the most affected by the “Project’s” many proposed changes to copyright law. But creators were apparently not even considered as eligible to participate in discussions with these elites.

Let me give you one small example from the many proposals — copyright registration and orphan works. Had they been included, photographers could have explained that they typically take hundreds of photographs in a single photo session. The registration recommendation in this report would require photographers to register each and every photograph with a government registry to protect against “orphaning”— the use of a copy of their works by someone who can’t seem to find them.

This registration idea has been around for quite a while. The pitch to artists is never from other artists — it’s usually pitched as a good thing because the Internet would unleash a torrent of untold riches if people could just find you. This must be someone’s idea of a joke, because if the Internet has unleashed anything on artists, it is not a torrent of people trying to pay us. It’s another kind of torrent — a Bit Torrent.

This registration issue is tricky — they can’t condition the right to copyright itself on registration because I’m told that would probably violate international law and land the U.S. in yet another arbitration (remember the Fairness in Music Licensing Act?). So a registration just allows your work to be exploited if the people who want to use the work can’t find you — even if they look really, really, really hard. That idea is something that any artist could have told the “Principles” elites was … well, incorrect. Had we been asked.

There are plenty of ways to find musicians, songwriters and recording artists right now. The problem isn’t that we can’t be found. The problem is that only the honest people want to look for us.

The market has already produced a solution to this. Artists who want to be found have registered with Getty Images, ASCAP, Flickr, BMI, SESAC, SoundExchange or Deviant Art and can continue to do so. Who benefits, then, from this registration requirement?

Big Tech. A Google lawyer told the Copyright Office that Google was interested in millions of orphans. In these recommendations, the person doing the looking has no incentive to actually find the artist because they benefit economically by failing to find artists.

I wonder.  

Is it really fair to say that “only the honest people” want to, or can, locate the authors of original works who are not part of the syndicates listed in that quote?  It is problematic, at first blush, that by the second click into his article Lowery ends up arguing over how his rights would be limited if a vile person made unauthorized use of pictures from one’s family photo album.  ”So are we all gonna have to register our family photos with Big Brother in order to keep control of them?,” he asks.

I was following until about … there.  Family photo album scenarios, it seems to me, are the last refuge of scoundrels in copyright debates.  But there is no question that digitization has made a mess of things, and that creators have less control over their works than ever before — something we all noticed a long time ago.  Lowery is on firmer equitable ground when he complains as follows about the practical ineffectiveness of the DMCA for photographers and songwriters:

For the uninitiated this is a-Whack-a-Mole game of “notice and shakedown” that creators can never win. I personally have to issue hundreds of take down notices to infringing sites each day (or hire a service to do this for me). Most of these sites then claim to remove the infringing file, but often within hours the identical file re-appears on the same site.

What to do?

One approach might be to start at Square One and take a serious look at what the Copyright Act at least purports to protect, and what it doesn’t, so that we don’t get bogged down in arguments about baby .  Next month I have oral argument in Ochre LLC v. Deutschebank, an appeal from a case where the Southern District of New York deemed a line of fairly famous, recognizable, original and creative lighting fixtures by my client, Ochre LLC — called the “Arctic Pair” — unprotectible on the ground that they are just lighting fixtures.  For all practical purposes, I argue on the appeal, the present position of the courts is that any artistic (sculptural) work that may have the property of providing illumination cannot, by virtue of shedding light, be a creative work — and that this was never the intent of Congress.  We seek to overturn both the dismissal of the copyright claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the original determination of the Copyright Office that the work could not be registered.

On the other hand, I also represent the creators of photographic works.  In another case that I am not going to specify here, my client is somewhat bogged down in problems arising from the status of his registration, or inability to register, some of his photographs (which he undertook to do prior to engaging me).  The registration of works, as Lowery notes, is the be-all and end-all of copyright remedies.  He also states, however, the following:

Let me give you one small example from the many proposals — copyright registration and orphan works. Had they been included, photographers could have explained that they typically take hundreds of photographs in a single photo session. The registration recommendation in this report would require photographers to register each and every photograph with a government registry to protect against “orphaning”— the use of a copy of their works by someone who can’t seem to find them.

This is an odd juxtaposition to me.  The way many courts interpret current law, if Da Vinci stuck a night light in the Mona Lisa’s mouth, he could not own the copyright in his painting of her if it were created and published in 2013.  On the other hand, photographers have an annoying problem:  It’s a real pain for them to go through the trouble of registering the hundreds of “creative works” they create in a single photo session.

I’m a photographer too, okay?  I put my pictures on Flickr and sometimes people want to use them, and in return for attribution, I let them.  The fact is, some people think some of the shots are pretty good — in many instances they are, I also believe subjectively, truly creative and original.  So I am entitled to control their use, even though I publish them for free.  Sometimes people use them without permission, and this makes me sad, but I do not try to make a living from my photos.  I merely seek to brighten your dark lives with my creative brilliance.

Other people, however, do want to make a living taking pictures.  Power to them.  But especially in light (*cough*) of the situation faced by my client, Ochre, which can’t even register truly original creative works that cost a fortune to create, it’s a little hard to feel sorry for people who have to go through the trouble of registering all those photographs, those hundreds of creative finger-twitches, in order to be able to protect them fully.  In fact, as David Newhoff argues, somewhat seeming to miss the implications of his own words:

So, again, the premise issuing from the chamber and reverberating on Twitter is predicated on smart sounding academic theory (i.e. simplifying a law) entirely untethered to a real or pragmatic world view.  The premise being proposed is that copyright ought to be easier to understand for any layman because it is now “everyone’s issue” because in the digital age, “we are all authors.”  This was the oft-repeated theme of live tweets by Gigi Sohn, President and co-founder of Public Knowledge and echoed at least once by Mike Masnick of TechDirt.  Of course, the truth is that just because the internet fosters a lot of production of stuff, that doesn’t make us all authors anymore than corporate softball teams make us all ballplayers.  On my best day, I don’t write as well as many authors I admire deeply; and on my worst day, I’m better than many a citizen whose claim to authorship is the possession of a smart phone and a pair of thumbs. . . .

[H]ad there been any creators asked to testify, they would have clearly demonstrated that academics like Professor Samuelson don’t know the first thing about the production of creative works or the nature of protecting them.  Somehow, all this translates into the failure of congress to understand the internet, but maybe it’s not that so much as some of the ideas being presented are kinda dumb and transparently self-serving.

I don’t know how the fact that we’re all “authors” does or does not cut across the geometric lines that connect and dissect the various interests aligned and opposed with respect to copyright.  I do think, however, that my example of what seems like an inexplicable inequity, i.e., the Arctic Pearl-vs.-snapshot copyright dichotomy, suggests that we’re not even starting with a realistic reckoning of what constitutes creativity, much what it make take properly to protect it.  Rather, we’re fighting — just as we see in trademark — over extant rent-collecting regimes that reflect all sorts of historical and technological developments that have nothing to do with fairness at all.

That’s a mistake.  We should have creators at the creation of any new copyright regime, and we should listen to what they have to say.  But we should also prepare them to defend why their creativity is as entitled to the range of protection they demand for it.  I don’t know how to measure units of creativity (are they like the “utiles” we learned about in economics?).  Newhoff, rejecting what he clealy views as a copyright-nihilism point of view that argues for simplicity but essentially stands for a very weak copyright regime indeed, writes, “More to the point, though, if technology has made the world of consuming content more complex, is it disingenuous to suggest that revising copyright to balance the rights of authors and consumers in the digital age would not produce an even more complex set of statutes?”

I think it would. But copyright enthusiasts across the arts implicated should be careful what they wish for on that score. The debate could prove very enlightening.

    


Free speech for hosers

Originally posted 2007-04-04 23:38:57. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

 

The headline: “Canada to trademark [sic] ‘winter’ for 2010 Olympics.”
The funny thing is I thought they already had a pretty good monopoly on winter!

    

The not so bright line

8709475540 f4d2c0cdd0 o The not so bright line

 

Parallel lines never intersect, do they?

The preamble of the Lanham Act Section 2 is followed by six lower-case–lettered sections, the fifth of which contains four separately numbered “grounds” on which it is permissible to refuse registration. No form of the word “generic” is to be found anywhere in any of them. How, then, does the USPTO prevent registration of generic names of the goods for which the marks are intended to be registered? . . .

We all know that a thermos keeps liquids warm or cold substantially longer than if the soup or soda were kept in a non– vacuum-insulated container. Many apparently believe that THERMOS is one of the leading brands of thermos. This seems nuts.

John Welch links to this fantastic article in the Trademark Reporter by Anthony L. Fletcher, discussing the critical — and, like so much in trademark law, vaguely described — legal distinction between generic and descriptive trademarks (or rather, in the case of genericness, would-be trademarks):

Most trademark lawyers are aware that generic names are unavailable for trademark protection under any circumstances, while merely descriptive terms are available for trademark protection if, and only if, they have acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace. “Secondary meaning” arises from use of a descriptive, or otherwise unprotectable, word or phrase in such a way, for a sufficient duration, and with enough frequency, that it becomes uniquely associated with the user and/or the user’s product(s).

It is “secondary” in that it refers to an acquired, rather than to an inherent, meaning. Accordingly, it is critical to understand the “generic”–“descriptive” dichotomy for trademark management and planning purposes. Promoting a name that can never become a trademark as if that name were a trademark is an exercise in futility. While promoting a generic name as a trademark might result in a degree of trademark recognition by the public, when that begins to happen, competitors can step in and, with impunity, appropriate to themselves and/or their products whatever degree of de facto trademark meaning might have been created. . . .

Unfortunately, the consensus of United States legal authority on what is generic rather than descriptive, and vice-versa, has become somewhat discordant. . . .

On the face of things, it appears that generic words are most likely to be nouns, while descriptive terms are more likely to be adjectives. On the face of things, there are also hundreds of judicial and administrative holdings on what is generic and what is not. But what is needed is guidance for determining whether a term is  generic or descriptive. That is not to say it hasn’t been attempted.

And here I break off for two reasons (copyright infringement not being one; I’m nowhere near the fair use threshold).  One is that you, dear reader, need a break.  And the other one is that what follows is worth its own separate block quote:

Perhaps the most colorful, and surely one of the most widely known, attempts at such guidance is: “A generic name is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”  Sadly, while the  formulation has literary merit, there is little reason to believe that jurists, jurors, or attorneys are adept at dividing intended brand names between genera and species.

Sweet.

RDC GREY The not so bright lineFletcher’s words here made me think of an unrelated intellectual property debate, including his allusion to literary merit.  I mean the decision in Cariou v. Prince, sadly not reported here in a timely fashion, which raised the topic, especially in the dissent, of what business and how much business the courts have in moving into literary criticism to decide the question of fair use base on transformation in copyright infringement cases.

Related, but too tangential for now.  Let’s revisit that one later.

I actually thought Fletcher’s criticism of this formulation would be, though, it was a tautology:  How do we know if something is generic?  Why, the name refers to the genus of the thing!  But I think that point would border on the tautological as well — in fact, the phrase “tautological standard in trademark law” is probably not only a tautology itself, but is probably, um, “generic,” along with “unpredictable standard in trademark law.” Or have you heard about this LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION thing?

Anyway, the article is great, and you have to read it (and I have to read it more, and better.)  Fletcher’s conclusion:

Quite simply, the problem is that it is impossible to foresee with tolerable accuracy where courts, or the USPTO, will draw the line between generic names and descriptive terms. We can probably all agree that “car” is generic and “fast” is descriptive, but what is a “sports car” or “muscle car”? Are they generic or descriptive-generic? “Car” is plainly generic. But if “light beer” is generic, there is no apparent reason why “sports car” can’t be.

He goes on to suggest a handful of approaches to the problem.  They do not, at first blush, simplify matters.  But perhaps, if adopted, they could clarify them — an end sorely to be desired in trademark law.  If it’s going to be this busy, this expensive, this profitable, can’t it be a little more predictable?

Or have I missed the point — again?

    


Don’t play games!

Originally posted 2008-01-24 15:30:04. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Nolo’s Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Blog links to this story here in answering the question, “How do I create a non-infringing board game”?”

    

Semaphores and metales

Originally posted 2007-01-23 17:16:51. Republished by Blog Post Promoter

Two kinds of analogy, as scrambled by an old and dear friend. Evidently, there is another kind. John Welch writes about a TTAB decision cancelling trademark registrations based on the petitioners use of the mark, for purposes of avoiding a defense of abandonment against the putative senior user, that is not quite trademark use but is “analogous to trademark use.” John writes about the rather thin reed on which the TTAB places the weight of this cancellation for the mark “ALS IK KAN” — Finnish for “All I Can” — by noting that the Board seemed to have done all it could to return the ownership of the mark to a lineal descendant of the senior user. I would have liked to hear more from John about this entire concept of “analogous to trademark use” use. Maybe I will.

    


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