- RGE - Is King Euro Naked? Europeans may find several historical and theoretical reasons why a political government for the euro area would be desirable. But after the global crisis there are technical reasons why it is more than desirable. That conclusion is a necessity in light of three increasingly important aspects of current monetary developments in Europe: (1) the lack of an exchange rate policy; (2) the absence of a European fiscal authority guaranteeing the stability of sovereign bonds; and (3) the collusive relationship developing between the European Central Bank (ECB), the banks, and the national governments hiding the costs to the taxpayers.
- RGE - Post-Crisis: What Should Be the Goal of a Fiscal Exit Strategy? One obvious fallout of the global financial crisis is a huge deterioration in fiscal conditions, particularly in advanced countries. [...] It really boils down to “plain vanilla” deficits—revenue losses from the recession, fiscal stimulus, and some underlying spending increases that would have occurred even without a recession. [...]The first step is to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.[...] But is stabilizing debt ratios at their post-crisis level enough?
- RGE - Balancing Fiscal Support with Fiscal Solvency As I noted in my last post, government deficits in many countries—particularly in advanced countries—have jumped dramatically in the wake of the global crisis, and government debt has reached levels that could jeopardize longer term macroeconomic stability and growth. [...] The challenge for policymakers is to formulate strategies for fiscal solvency—what we often call “exit strategies”—and communicate these strategies to the general public.[...] Are there actions that governments can undertake today to enhance their credibility without negatively affecting aggregate demand?
- RGE - ECB Shows the Exit: Timing and Signposts [...] the central bank is increasingly feeling the need to regain control of market interest rates via a progressive mopping up of excess liquidity. [...] As a result, ECB figures confirm that banks’ net asset purchases of government bonds more than tripled and now stand at EUR 150bn: banks enjoyed a positive carry which was much needed for their impaired bottom lines, and governments were able to finance the heaviest supply in history which allowed them to undertake a significant (though not dramatic) fiscal easing. Something for everyone. Faced with a stabilizing macro and financial picture, the question is: what’s next?
- McKinsey & Company - Imbalances that strain the eurozone: "[...] Much less noticed has been the steady rise in current account deficits and surpluses among eurozone countries since the adoption of the common currency in 1999. [...] Although the eurozone's collective current account has seen only modest deficits and surpluses, the sum of the absolute value of its current deficits and surpluses rose at a 16.3 percent annual rate after 2000—more than twice as fast as the 6.7 percent annual pace of increase in the 1990s. To put this in perspective, the U.S. current account deficit grew by 7 percent per year during this period, while China's surplus grew at a 43 percent annual rate.
[...] Meanwhile, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have run growing current account deficits since 2000, both with other eurozone countries and with the rest of the world. Spain's overall current account deficit reached $154 billion in 2008, the largest of any country in the eurozone, and equal to roughly 10 percent of GDP—much bigger proportionally than the U.S. deficit at its peak. Greece and Portugal had even bigger current account deficits relative to GDP in 2008.
[...] In deficit countries, foreign capital flows fell sharply in 2008, by some 28 percent in Spain and 30 percent in Portugal, for example, contributing to deep recessions. Today, after the wage and price run—ups that occurred in the deficit countries during the boom, their exports are less competitive on world markets than those of other eurozone countries. [...]
[...] In addition, running a continued current account deficit adds to the national debt, whether it is in the form of government debt (as in Italy) or private debt (as in Spain, Portugal, and Greece). And at some point, these debts must be repaid. Although the use of a common currency removes the risk of a sudden currency depreciation causing the value of foreign debt to soar, the repayment will still represent a transfer of wealth and income out of the country to investors elsewhere.
[...] It will also require adopting policies to promote higher productivity growth in the deficit countries of Southern Europe, which will raise incomes and create more competitive exports. [...]"
- arquivo: Ausência de caminho?| Pedro Adão e Silva [...] Moral da história: sem o pacote de estímulos, a recessão teria sido bem mais profunda e o desemprego ainda pior. Foi quebrado o ciclo vicioso que nos ameaçava, mas os riscos estão longe de terem sido eliminados. Que fazer agora? Estamos perante um dilema dramático: não temos recursos para manter a economia alimentada pelo consumo público, mas não há condições para não o fazer.
Há três caminhos possíveis, todos muito exíguos: diminuir a despesa (sendo que a que resta é tremendamente rígida); aumentar impostos (não se vê quais) e estimular a economia, continuando a aumentar a despesa. Provavelmente, é preciso fazer de tudo um pouco. Mas também é necessário que nos libertemos dos que, enquanto se entretêm a repetir que o cenário é negro, não conseguem vislumbrar nenhum caminho.
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